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Abstract:  This thesis will create an argument for how the victims of gang violence from the 
Northern Triangle nations of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras qualify for 
asylum in the United States based on a well-founded fear of persecution.  An 
analysis of the legal framework of the asylum system in the United States, profiles 
of the two largest gangs in the Northern Triangle the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 
18, a profile of the asylum seekers arriving at the United States border, the criminal 
activity that the gangs engage in, and the way that this activity is political in nature 
will form the argument that gang violence is inherently political in the Northern 
Triangle.  UNHCR reports and local Northern Triangle police data will illustrate 
the circumstances of de facto gang rule in the region and DHS statistics will show 
how the growing numbers of Central American asylees necessitate a U.S. policy 
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On February 15th,  2019 President Trump stood in the White House Rose Garden and 
shared his views on the influx of Central Americans at the Southern border, stating: “We’re talking 
about an invasion of our country with drugs, with human traffickers, with all types of criminals 
and gangs”1  This rhetoric is not new for the Trump administration and discussions of a border 
wall, a border crisis, and gang infiltration of the United States have been popular in U.S. media 
since his inauguration.  What the Trump administration gets wrong about this “invasion” is that 
the threat of gang violence is not present at U.S. at the Southern Border, on the contrary the 
migrants at the border are in fact the gangs’ victims.  Trump’s labeling of asylees at the border as 
“criminals and gangs” is an effort to fund a wall that will keep out the region’s most vulnerable 
migrants, the asylee victims of gang violence.  Seven months prior to President Trump’s Rose 
Garden proclamation, on June 11, 2018 then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions stated: “Generally, 
claims by aliens pertaining to… gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not 
qualify for asylum.”2  This statement ignores the complicated reality of how the gangs and the 
government in the Northern Triangle nations of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are related, 
and how they are both perpetrators of the gang violence that the Central American asylees are 
fleeing.  Post-war gang proliferation and rampant government corruption in the Northern Triangle 
have blurred the line separating governmental actors from gang members, and civilian opposition 
to gang violence has become inherently political.  Refusing to be extorted, recruited, or sexually 
assaulted are political acts in the context of de facto gang rule and should be treated as such in the 
U.S. immigration system. 
                                                        
1 Paletta, Damien, Mike DeBonis, and John Wagner. "Trump Declares National Emergency on 
Southern Border in Bid to Build Wall." The Washington Post, February 15, 2019. 
2 Sessions, Jeff. 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).   
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A history of societal upheaval and social unrest has created an environment in which 
criminal organizations and government entities in the Northern Triangle nations often lack clear 
boundaries.  The region was ravaged by civil wars and economic dependence on foreign aid in the 
twentieth century and the aftermath of decades of brutality created a migration surge of Central 
American migrants into the United States.  When immigration policies in the 1990s led to record 
numbers of deportations, gang ties that were created in the U.S. were exported to the weakened 
societies of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and security and economic forces were easily 
manipulated to the advantage of criminal organizations.  The governments’ attempts at hardline 
anti-gang policies backfired, creating an impetus for higher gang recruitment and more widespread 
government mistrust.  As a result, “Gangs in Central America ended up more violent and more 
organized because government responses compelled them to strengthen, as well as provided the 
opportunities and resources to do it through the areas of illegality and the networks of crime 
broadened by such policies.”3 The gangs have been able to recruit, adapt, and fortify their 
structures in response to these failed policies and their political intrusions have become a threat to 
democracy in the region.  This thesis will argue that the failure of state governments’ and 
transformation of the gangs into political entities gives the asylees coming to the United States a 
legitimate claim to asylum based on a well-founded fear of political persecution. 
This thesis will explain how the gang violence in the Northern Triangle constitutes 
legitimate political persecution by first establishing the legal definitions of asylum, political 
persecution, and gangs in “Chapter I. Central Definitions” using historical definitions rooted in the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations 1951 Convention 
                                                        
3 Bruneau, Thomas C., Lucía Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner. Maras: Gang Violence and 
Security in Central America. Austin, TX. University of Texas Press. 2012. 139. 
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Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the United States Immigration and Nationality Act.  The 
second chapter, “Northern Triangle Gangs,” will outline the major gangs in the region and will use 
historical accounts of the region’s civil unrest, the migration of Central Americans to the United 
States, and their subsequent deportations back to the Northern Triangle to show how the gangs 
were formed.  Various National Police reports will then explain the demographics of the gangs in 
question.  “Chapter III. Asylum Trends & Demographics” will create a profile of the asylum 
seekers relevant to this analysis using Department of Homeland Security data and United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees reports.  After profiling the perpetrators and victims of gang 
violence in the region the fourth chapter, “Well-Founded Fear” will then describe how said 
violence constitutes a well-founded fear of persecution and describe the conditions that the Central 
American asylum seekers are fleeing using FBI reports, detailed Insight Crime reports regarding 
gang activity in the region, World Bank, and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
reports.  The fifth and final chapter of this thesis, “The Politics of Gangs,” will elaborate on how 
the combination of the inefficiency of government forces, the widespread regional corruption, and 
the politicization of the gang actors makes the persecution political by using various United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reports of corruption, reports from the Due Process of 
Law Foundation, and AmericasBarometer studies of public trust in the government.  The variety 
of data and sources used in this thesis serve to argue that the asylum applications in the United 
States from victims of gang violence in the Northern Triangle are based on a legitimate political 
persecution and their asylum claims should be adjudicated as such. 
Chapter I. Central Definitions  
An effective analysis of asylum, persecution based on political opinion, and gang violence 
necessitates the establishment of certain definitions.  Starting with “asylum,” this thesis will 
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explain how the laws governing U.S. immigration law are set in the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, (INA) whose definitions are based on the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees 
(UNHCR) and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) definitions of 
a refugee.  Using these documents, this chapter will define asylum by looking at the definition of 
a refugee offered by the UNHCR 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and how 
this definition is built upon Article 14 of the 1948 UDHR, where the right to asylum is first 
recognized internationally.  In order to clarify a definition of “persecution based on political 
opinion,” this chapter also sets out to establish what the definition of political opinion is with 
regards to asylum and immigration legal precedence in the United States.  Finally, this chapter will 
define who the relevant actors are in this analysis of gang violence by defining “gangs” in 
accordance with U.S. law and detailing which specific gang actors are at work in the Northern 
Triangle nations.  A brief historical background will accompany each definition to provide context 
for the analysis that follows. 
Asylum 
The history of the asylum system in the United States begins with the 1948 United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Drafted three years after the initial establishment of the 
United Nations, the document outlines the basic human rights that will be protected universally.  
The first of its kind, the signatories to the UDHR believed that “the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”4  
Among the protected rights listed in the document are rights to security, protection from torture, 
religious freedom, and freedom of movement.  The Declaration also explicitly declares the 
universal right to asylum in Article 14: 
                                                        
4 United Nations General Assembly. "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Paris. 1948. 1.  
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“Article 14: 1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum 
from persecution. 2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions 
genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations”5 
 
Points 14.1 and 14.2 of the UDHR are relevant to this analysis because the first part explicitly 
states that “everyone” has the right to seek asylum, but the second part sets limits to this by 
excluding the victims of “non-political crimes.”  This point is important in regard to this thesis 
because it shows how gang violence must be considered political in order to serve as grounds for 
asylum, as per the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was created in 1950, just 
two years after the publication of the UDHR and five years after the founding of the United 
Nations.  Initially established as a response to the refugee crisis facing Europe at the end of World 
War II, the office has since been involved in numerous international crises of forcibly displaced 
communities, stateless persons, and refugee crises.  The UNHCR 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees explicitly defines the term “refugee” and sets out to define refugee rights and 
national obligations to refugee protection.  Article 1 (A) (2) of the Convention defines a refugee 
as: 
“Any person who… owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, 
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”6 
 
The particular parts of this definition that are of interest to this analysis are the concepts of “well-
founded fear of persecution” and “political opinion,” as the basis of this thesis will be to explore 
how victims of gang violence in the Northern Triangle have legitimate political asylum claims in 
                                                        
5 U.N. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” 4. 
6 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.” Geneva. 1951. 14. 
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the U.S.  Showing that the violence they face constitutes a “well-founded fear” and how refusing 
to cooperate with the de-facto rule of the gangs in the region constitutes a “political opinion” is 
central to this argument and will be explored in greater detailing in forthcoming chapters.  In 
addition to defining a refuge, the 1951 Convention emphasizes the need for international 
commitment to refugee protection by mandating the concept of “non-refoulment.”  Echoing the 
language of the Article 1 definition of a refugee and central to the Convention’s principals, non-
refoulment is defined in Article 33 as follows: 
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion.”7 
 
Non-refoulment is an important aspect of the 1951 Convention as it introduces legal protection for 
refugees from being forcibly returned to their home country.  The definition of a refugee and the 
concept of non-refoulment as outlined in the UNHCR 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees form the foundation for the international definitions of and legal protections afforded to 
refugees and asylees.   
The United States is a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
and therefore its immigration laws relating to asylum and refugees reference the Convention’s 
language as well.  U.S. immigration law is dictated by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 
the first Act in U.S. history to organize immigration and citizenship laws into one document.  
While there have been numerous amendments to the Act since it was first enacted in 1952, the 
current definition of an asylee in the INA section 1158(b)(1)(A) states that an alien may be granted 
asylum if they fall under the definition of a refugee.  The INA definition of a refugee is then found 
                                                        
7 U.N.HC.R. “The 1951 Convention.” 30. 
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in section 1101(a)(42)(A) and is almost the verbatim definition of a refugee under the UNHCR 
1951 Convention, with the INA text as follows: 
“Any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case 
of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last 
habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”8 
 
While listing these separate definitions may seem redundant, it is important to trace the roots of 
the definition of asylum in this manner because asylees are not explicitly defined in the UDHR, 
UNHCR, or INA.  Asylees and refugees differ in their manner of arrival to the receiving nation, 
with asylees applying for asylum either at the port-of-entry or once within the receiving nation’s 
borders and refugees are processed in a third-party nation and arrive at the receiving nation with a 
pre-determined refugee status.  Nonetheless, in U.S. asylum law all legal definitions of an asylee 
are rooted in the United Nations’ historical definitions of a refugee, and for the purpose of this 
thesis the precise legal definition of an asylee in the U.S. must be made clear. 
Persecution Based on Political Opinion 
 The definition of “persecution based on political opinion” in relation to asylum law is 
legally elusive; not in any of the documents and laws governing asylum is there a clear definition 
of what constitutes political persecution.  When no legal definition is mandated in law, a legal 
definition relies on case precedents and in the case of asylum law in the U.S. there has been little 
regarding gang violence.  An asylum practice advisory issued by the National Immigrant Justice 
Center succinctly explains the current state of legal precedence regarding asylum for victims of 
                                                        
8 United States of America. “Immigration and Nationality Act, with Amendments and Notes on 
Related Laws: Committee Print for the Use of the Committee on the Judiciary.” House of 
Representatives. United States. Washington. 1980. Section 1158(b)(1)(A). 
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gang violence.  The advisory explains how Jeff Sessions’ 2018 decision regarding asylum for 
survivors of domestic violence and violence perpetrated by non-state actors overrules a prior 
decision granting asylum for these victims in particular situations.  The advisory then explains,  
“While the decision gives the impression that these claims are foreclosed, nearly all the damaging 
language is dicta, and the Refugee Convention, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and 
precedential case law at the Courts of Appeals and Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) continue 
to support much of what the BIA previously held in [the previous precedent]. In short, the 
holding… is narrow and much of the damage done is a matter of optics, not law.”9  This means 
that while then-Attorney General Sessions intended to create a precedent that would exclude 
victims of domestic and gang violence from asylum in the U.S., the legal framework regarding 
these groups is still rooted in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the INA 
and is generally favorable to the populations in question. 
Gangs 
The United States Code defines the subject matter of all of the laws in the United States; 
the document is divided by subject and published every six years by the Office of the Law Revision 
Counsel of the U.S. House of Representatives.  According to the U.S. Code Title 18 (Crimes and 
Criminal Procedure), under Part 1 (Crimes), Chapter 26 (Criminal Street Gangs), Section 521 a 
gang is defined in U.S. Federal Law as: 
“An ongoing group, club, organization, or association of 5 or more persons— 
(A) that has as 1 of its primary purposes the commission of 1 or more of the criminal 
offenses described in subsection (c); 
(B) the members of which engage, or have engaged within the past 5 years, in a 
continuing series of offenses described in subsection (c); and 
(C) the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce.” 
                                                        
9 National Immigrant Justice Center. "Applying for Asylum After Matter of A-B: Matter of A-B- 
Changes the Complexion of Claims Involving Non-State Actors, but Asylum Fundamentals 
Remain Strong and Intact." Asylum Practice Advisory. June 2018. 1. 
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The offenses referenced in subsection (c) include felonies involving controlled substances felonies 
involving crimes of violence, any offense involving human trafficking or sexual abuse, and 
conspiracy to commit any of the previously mentioned crimes.   This federal definition is used by 
both the Department of Justice for U.S. interior crime enforcement and the Department of 
Homeland Security for immigration-related crime enforcement.  Following this provided 
language, the two main gangs in the Northern Triangle nations that will be analyzed in this thesis, 
Mara Salvatrucha, also known as MS-13 and Barrio 18, also known as La 18 can be legally 
classified as gangs in U.S. federal law.  Both gangs are involved in extensive criminal activities 
and networks, and the members of the gangs engage directly with the crimes.  Additional details 
on the history and demographics of MS-13 and La 18 as well as the activities they engage in will 
be detailed in Chapter II of this thesis. 
 While the definitions provided in Chapter I of this thesis are somewhat repetitive, it is 
necessary to include the explicit definitions of “asylum,” “persecution based on political opinion,” 
and “gangs” because they are the topics most central to an exploration of political asylum for 
victims of gang violence in Central America.  The inclusion of the exact language that informs 
immigration law and outlining the general history of the codification of these terms creates a 
framework that can be referenced when looking at the modern understanding of asylum and gang 
persecution. 
Chapter II. Northern Triangle Gangs 
The violence that asylum seekers are fleeing in Central America can be largely attributed 
to the two main gangs in the region, Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, and Barrio 18, or La 18. The 
initial formation and subsequent proliferation of these two gangs throughout Central America is 
directly tied to unrest in the region in the twentieth century and to changes to U.S. immigration 
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policy in the 1990s.  A brief historical context of both follows in order to provide a thorough 
definition of the main gang actors and to show the conditions that allowed for their rise to power. 
History of MS-13 and La 18 
The twentieth century in Central America was marked by widespread civil unrest. In El 
Salvador, a civil war raged from 1979 until 1992 and was a brutally violent power struggle between 
the military-led government of El Salvador and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front 
(FMLN), a group of leftist guerilla organizations.  In an effort to curb the FMLN, the Salvadoran 
military received $3.5 billion in aid from the U.S. government10, fueling a war that saw an 
unknown number of disappearances and the deaths of at least 75,000 Salvadorans.11  The brutality 
of the Salvadoran Civil War was mirrored in Guatemala in the Guatemalan Civil War that lasted 
from 1960 until 1996.  Conservative reports of over 200,000 deaths of indigenous Maya have been 
reported and the military-led atrocities of the war have since been labelled a genocide.12  While 
Honduras did not experience an official civil war like those of El Salvador and Guatemala during 
this time, the effect of the neighboring nations’ instability led to a financial crisis and increasing 
reliance on U.S. aid.  In need of economic support, the Honduran government allowed the Reagan 
administration to use Honduras as a military training ground for the El Salvadoran military and 
                                                        
10 United States General Accounting Office. El Salvador: Accountability for U.S. Military and 
Economic Aid: Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. Washington, DC: Office, 1990. 8. 
11 Wilson, Leah, and Alexis Stoumbelis. "‘Removing the Veil’: El Salvador Apologizes for State 
Violence on 20th Anniversary of Peace Accords."  North American Congress in Latin America, 
January 12, 2012.  
12 Rothenberg, Daniel. Memory of Silence: the Guatemalan Truth Commission Report. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2012. 17-23. 
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the Contras in Nicaragua,13 making the economic, political, and military relationships in the region 
even more complicated and strained.  
The history of civil wars and economic unrest in the region created conditions for mass 
migration form the Northern Triangle to the United States.  Those who migrated were often at an 
economic disadvantage upon arriving in the U.S. and relied on the support of their ethnic enclaves 
abroad.  Ultimately, some of the newly displaced Central Americans in the U.S. ended up joining 
or forming gangs in order to protect themselves in an unfamiliar country.14  The passage of the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996 during the 
Clinton administration increased the immigration consequences for engaging in criminal activities 
and resulted in the deportation of thousands of these gang members back to the Northern Triangle.  
The gangs then regrouped and fortified their relations in the post-war political vacuums of El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.  The concentration of gang members in Central America 
skyrocketed in the 1990s and early 2000s as a result of this spike in deportations of criminal 
offenders back to their native countries in the region.   
The two main gangs in power in Central America are Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18. 
These two gangs are bitter rivals and while their territory spans throughout Central America, 
Mexico, and the U.S., their power and their power struggles are concentrated in the Northern 
Triangle.  Their structure is difficult to analyze, as MS-13 and La 18 are characterized by their 
“fluid, dynamic organization and complex, clandestine hierarchies.”15  Although their structures 
                                                        
13 Rosenberg, Mark B. Honduras in the Central American Conflict: Trends and Recent 
Developments. Florida International University Latin American and Caribbean Center. July 
1988. 4. 
14 Miller, Spring, and James Cavallaro. No Place to Hide: Gang, State, and Clandestine Violence 
in El Salvador. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, 2010. 51. 
15 Miller, et al. No Place to Hide. 57. 
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are intentionally covert, their fundamental features have been shown to involve sophisticated and 
transnational organizational structure, consolidation of territorial presence and power, and extreme 
violence against those who refuse recruitment or those who live in gang-controlled territories.16  
Locals in gang-controlled areas live in fear of being violently recruited or subject to a threatening 
gang presence in their hometowns, and the fact that MS-13 and La 18 are at war with each other 
only further exacerbates the fear of violence among the Northern Triangle’s population.  This 
perpetual inter-gang war creates an incredibly hostile race for domination and recruitment amongst 
the youth in the region, and protection from the violence of one gang often means joining its rival. 
The gangs are prominent in both rural and urban areas alike and often serve as the de facto 
law and order where the police are unwilling or unable to work against them.  In fact, MS-13 and 
La 18 have been able to act as “despotic, de facto governments with commercial and criminal 
motives, with a ‘political agenda to control state governing and security institutions' and ‘an agenda 
to control people and territory.”17  The power and control that the gangs are able to exercise is a 
relatively new, post-IIRIRA phenomena and was intensified by the Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and 
Honduran government’s employment of an aggressively harsh anti-gang program called mano 
dura, or “iron fist,” in the early 2000s.  The main focus of the mano dura plan was to “arrest away” 
the gangs and take them off the streets, however this was done in increasingly violent manners, 
and has itself been seen as a form of legal violence.  Legal violence perpetrated by the state “refers 
to the state's legitimate use of force and its capacity to expand its limits in order to fight crime. It 
can entail the alteration of laws to provide discretionary powers to state institutions.”18  Mano dura 
                                                        
16 Miller, et al. No Place to Hide. 56-88. 
17 Uchimaya, Diane. "Falling through the Cracks: Gang Victims as Casualties in Current Asylum 
Jurisprudence." Berkeley La Raza Law Journal 23 (2015). 109-62. 147-148. 
18 Cruz, José Miguel. "Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America: The Survival 
of the Violent State." Latin American Politics and Society 53, no. 04 (Winter 2011). 1-33.  21. 
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policies manifested in police and military forces further terrorizing the people in their territories 
under the guise of rooting out gang members. This policy ultimately led to prison overcrowding, 
strengthening of gang ties, and the recruitment of new gang members behind bars, as it has been 
reported that those who were wrongfully arrested for being a gang member were successfully 
recruited after they were put in prison.19  The failure of the mano dura policies in the region will 
be elaborated on further in Chatper V. 
The political context that led to the formation of MS-13 and La 18 are useful in 
understanding how and why the gangs have spread and gained power in the region and how the 
history of gang-rule in the region impacts the general demographics of both MS-13 and La 18. 
Gang Demographics: El Salvador 
 Gang membership in El Salvador grew rapidly following the post-IIRIRA deportations of 
gang members back to El Salvador, and MS-13 and La 18 membership soared.  The first 
comprehensive analysis of gang demographics in El Salvador was completed by undergraduate 
students, Margarita Mancía and María de Los Ángeles Salgado at the Universidad 
Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas in San Salvador in 1991.  Studying gang membership the 
year that the Salvadoran Civil War concluded, the students discovered that over three-quarters of 
gang members were lower to lower-middle class males between the ages of seven and thirty-one 
years old;20  the demographic makeup of the gangs largely remains the same.  The past two decades 
have seen a surge in membership and geographic spread of both MS-13 and La 18 in El Salvador.  
A 2004 dataset published by the El Salvador Policia Nacional Civil showed that there were roughly 
10,200 gang members spread across the fourteen departments of El Salvador, and a 2009 report 
                                                        
19 Uchimaya, Diane. "Falling through the Cracks: Gang Victims as Casualties in Current Asylum 
Jurisprudence." Berkeley La Raza Law Journal 23 (2015): 109-162. 129. 
20 Bruneau, et. al. “Maras.” 44. 
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increased this population to 16,000.21  The history of the nation’s power struggles during its civil 
war and the instability left in its aftermath have contributed to the rise in numbers and the 
geographic spread of gang members in El Salvador. 
Gang Demographics: Guatemala 
Neighbor to El Salvador is Guatemala, a country similarly ravaged by civil war in the 
twentieth century and home to comparable social, economic, and political turmoil.  It follows that 
the demographic makeup of gang members is similar to that of El Salvador.  While there are other 
gangs in Guatemala that engage in criminal activities and violent behaviors, a 2006 USAID 
assessment showed that MS-13 and La 18 accounted for 95% of all gang membership in 
Guatemala.22  The Policia Nacional Civil in Guatemala has estimated that gang membership in 
2006 was between 8,000 and 10,000 individuals23 and a separate report gives the average age of a 
Guatemalan gang member to be 14.7 years old.24  The youthfulness of the gang members in 
Guatemala has been attributed to the lack of social programs available in the country.  In the 
aftermath of the 36 yearlong civil, war Guatemala is one of the poorest nations in Latin America 
with half of the country living in poverty and only one in three citizens enrolled in educational 
programs.25 These post-civil war societal conditions serve as a main contributing factor to 
membership in MS-13 and La 18 in Guatemala. 
Gang Demographics: Honduras 
Honduras, the central neighbor to both nations, has an even equally rampant gang issue.  
The Community Police of Honduras has estimated that gang membership in the nation is between 
                                                        
21 Bruneau, et. al. “Maras.” 46.  
22 Bruneau, et. al. “Maras.” 72.  
23 Bruneau, et. al. “Maras.” 72. 
24 Bruneau, et. al. “Maras.” 79 
25 Bruneau, et. al. “Maras.” 75. 
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10,000 and 15,000 individuals.26  Located at the center of the Northern Triangle, Honduras shares 
large borderlands with both El Salvador and Guatemala and its gang membership may be attributed 
to its geographic location.  Its borders are vulnerable to a largely unchecked migratory flow 
between the three nations of both gang members and gang activities.  Thousands of mareros, or 
gang members, are at work within Honduras’ borders and “From terrorizing local businesses with 
demands for protection ‘taxes’ and threats of violence to intra-gang warfare, hired hits, armed 
robberies and assaults on public transport, the two predominant maras… simply outman security 
forces in Honduras.”27  Not unlike its neighbors, MS-13 and La 18 have been able to get a strong 
foothold in Honduras by overwhelming security and political forces in the nation.  The lasting 
economic effects of the region’s twentieth-century tumult has left Honduras ill-equipped to deal 
with the transnational nature of gang activities. 
In conclusion, Chapter II of this thesis details the history and demographics of the two 
major gangs in the Northern Triangle in order to give a clear profile of who is involved in the 
gangs and where the two gangs function. 
Chapter III. Asylum Trends & Demographics 
Chapter I of this thesis followed the language in the UDHR, UNHCR, and INA to offer a 
legal definition of an asylee, however did not elaborate on the process of applying for asylum in 
the U.S.  In order to provide a full picture of the experience of Central American asylees it is 
necessary to give a brief overview of the ways one can apply for asylum and what the steps of the 
process are.   
Asylum Process 
                                                        
26 Bruneau, et. al. “Maras.” 89. 
27 Bruneau, et. al. “Maras.” 88. 
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As stated earlier, the difference between a refugee and an asylee is the manner in which 
they arrive to the receiving country; in the U.S., refugees apply for refugee status abroad and arrive 
to the receiving country as an approved refugee, while asylees can apply for asylum affirmatively 
when they arrive at a port of entry or defensively when have already been apprehended by 
immigration officials for entering the U.S. without documentation.  Affirmative asylum 
applications are processed by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
arm of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and defensive applications are processed by 
DHS’ judicial branch, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).  Affirmative asylum 
applications can be made immediately at a port of entry, such as a border crossing station or marine 
entry, or can be made voluntarily within one year of initial authorized entry into the U.S.  If 
someone has been detained or placed in removal proceeding and applies for defensive asylum in 
front of an EOIR judge then the applicant must pass a “credible fear” interview, where a judge 
determines the veracity of a persecution claim.  If the claim is deemed credible, the applicant can 
receive asylum status.  If the claim is denied, the applicant will likely be deported back to their 
native country.   
Asylum applicants from the Northern Triangle nations apply for defensive asylum much 
more often than affirmative asylum, and defensive asylum claims are significantly less likely to be 
approved.  Data from the DHS “Annual Flow Report: Refugees and Asylees: 2017” shows that in 
2017, affirmative asylum applicants from El Salvador had a 17.98% approval rate while defensive 
asylum applicants had a 3.76% approval rate.28  Similar data is reported for applicants from 
Guatemala and Honduras, with 16.58% and 15.98% approval rates for affirmative applications, 
                                                        
28 United States of America. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration 
Statistics. Annual Flow Report: Refugees and Asylees: 2017. By Nadwa Mossad. March 2019. 8-
9. 
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respectively, and 4.41% and 4.72% approval rates for defensive applications.29  The fact that 
defensive applications from all three Northern Triangle nations have a significantly lower approval 
rate than affirmative applications is important because applicants from all three countries are 
significantly more likely to apply for defensive asylum than affirmative asylum.  In fact, in 2017 
defensive asylum applications from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras made up 75.79%, 
63.55%, and 73.90% of all asylum claims, respectively, from each nation.30  
A possible factor in the low approval of defensive asylum applications is that non-citizens 
in immigration court are not afforded the right to counsel; data from Syracuse University’s 
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) shows that between 60% and 80% of those 
appearing in immigration court who have never been detained are represented by counsel, 
compared to 10% to 30% of those appearing in immigration court who have been detained 
appearing with counsel.31  Since apprehension and detention are usually the prerequisite for 
defensive asylum applications it follows that previously detained defensive applicants are less 
likely to be represented in front of an EOIR judge and therefore more likely to be denied asylum. 
The high proportion of defensive applications from each nation, the lower likelihood of defensive 
asylum approvals, and the low levels of detained individuals appearing in EOIR court without 
counsel negatively affects asylum trends in the region. 
Asylum Trends by Nation 
 Looking at the most recently published DHS data from 2015, 2016, and 2017 each of the 
three Northern Triangle nations have experienced a significant increase in asylum applicants in the 
                                                        
29 United States. Annual Flow Report. 8-9. 
30 United States. Annual Flow Report.. 8-9. 
31 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) - Comprehensive, Independent, and 
Nonpartisan Information on Federal Enforcement, Staffing and Funding. October 16, 2017. 
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U.S. while approval of their asylum claims has decreased.  The following chart is compiled from 
the most recent data available in the DHS “Annual Flow Report: Refugees and Asylees: 2017,” 
showing the past total number of affirmative and defensive asylum applications received and 
approved from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. 
Table 1. Affirmative and Defensive Asylum Data from 
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras 2015 – 2017. 
All data in Table 1 is gathered from the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Immigration Statistics and 
Office of Strategy, Policy & Plans March 2019 “Annual Flow Report: Refugees and Asylees: 2017.”32 
 
Compared with its 2015 applicants, data from 2017 shows a 150.53% increase in total asylum 
applications received from El Salvador compared to 2015 and a difference of -4.14% in the asylum 
approval rates.  Similarly, data for Guatemala shows that DHS received 100.50% more 
applications in 2017 than in 2015 and the asylum approval rate decreased -3.58%.  In 2017 there 
were 84.49% more applications for asylum from Honduras than there were in 2015 and the claims 
were -2.05% less likely to be approved.  The percentage shifts in these asylum trends are indeed 
important to note for trend analysis, however it cannot be forgotten that every number evaluated 
in this study is an actual person.  In 2017 alone 107,394 applications for asylum were processed 
from Northern Triangle nations and only 8,473 were approved; 98,921 Central American asylum 
seekers were denied. 
                                                        
32 United States. Annual Flow Report.” 
 2017 2016 2015 
 Received Approved Rate Received Approved Rate Received Approved Rate 
E.S. 47,260 3,471 7.34% 28,372 2,148 7.57% 18,864 2,164 11.48% 
Gua. 33,398 2,954 8.84% 22,960 1,916 8.34% 16,657 2,069 12.42% 
Hds. 26,736 2,048 7.66% 17,193 1,482 8.62% 14,492 1,407 9.71% 
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When analyzing this table, it is important to include the population of the asylee’s native 
country in mind. For example, El Salvador has a population of 6.378 million people and a total of 
47,260 asylum applicants in the U.S. in 2017: these applicants make up .75% of the nation’s entire 
population.  For comparison, another top nation in terms of asylum applications received in the 
U.S. is China, and in 2017 DHS received 19,606 applications from the nation of 1.386 billion, 
making up .00001% of their population.33  What’s more, 28.30% of the 19,606 applications 
received from China were approved in 2017 compared to between 7% and 9% of total applications 
for the Northern Triangle nations.  El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras remain three of the top 
six nations applying for affirmative asylum and three of the top four nations applying for defensive 
asylum in the U.S., and while the quantity of applications from the Northern Triangle continue to 
climb, approval rates are declining.  This discrepancy in asylum adjudication trends signals a need 
for a policy change that reflects the changing frequency of asylum applications from Central 
America.   
Asylee Demographic Shift 
Not only are the numbers of asylum applications from the Northern Triangle shifting, the 
demographics of the applicants are changing as well.  In the twentieth century most migrant groups 
from Central America, not necessarily asylees, were younger men fleeing the violence and 
instability of the region’s civil wars and seeking economic opportunity to support their families at 
home.  Since the rise of the gangs in the region, this demographic has changed to include huge 
numbers of women and children travelling both together and separately.  
 The twenty-first century has seen a major focus in immigration-related media on the crisis 
of unaccompanied minors from the Northern Triangle and Mexico at the southern U.S border.  The 
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numbers of unaccompanied minors being apprehended at the border has been increasing 
exponentially, and in 2013 U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) has reported 21,537 of 
apprehensions of unaccompanied minors from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras compared 
to 4,059 in 2011.34  This 430% increase in apprehensions of unaccompanied minors from the 
Northern Triangle can be directly attributed to the increased violence and criminal behavior of the 
region’s gang forces.  When asked why they fled their home in a study conducted by the UNHCR 
in 2014, 66% of children from El Salvador, 20% of children from Guatemala, and 44% of children 
from Honduras cited the fear of violence from armed criminal actors as their primary motivation 
for migrating.35 
Minors migrating from the Northern Triangle are not always unaccompanied and recent 
migration trends from the region show that many women and mothers are migrating with their 
children to seek safety in the U.S.  DHS reports refer to a mother and child migrating together as 
a family unit, and “US Government statistics show that over 66,000 families arrived in the United 
States in fiscal year 2014.”36  The majority of the women migrating from Central America have 
listed the fear of gang violence, extortion, and sexual assault as the main reasons for moving their 
families to the U.S.  The UNHCR conducted a study of female migrants from the Northern Triangle 
and Mexico in 2015 and found that 85% of the women interviewed were leaving gang-controlled 
neighborhoods, where “they described being raped, assaulted, extorted, and threatened by 
members of criminal armed groups, including gangs and drug cartels.”37  The first response many 
                                                        
34 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Children on the Run: Unaccompanied 
Children Leaving Central America and Mexico and the Need for International Protection.” 2014. 
15. 
35 UNHCR. “Children on the Run.” 9-10 
36 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Women on the Run: First-Hand Accounts 
of Refugees Fleeing El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico.” 2015. 3. 
37 UNHCR. “Women on the Run.” 4. 
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of the women interviewed had was to report their assaults to the police, however the 60% of the 
interviewees that reported attacks received insufficient or no protection from the police and 40% 
refused to report to the authorities at all citing the futility of reporting to inept and corrupt 
authorities.38  Receiving no protection at home, two-thirds of the women interviewed reported 
being internally displaced at one or more points in an attempt to move to a gang-free area within 
their own country to no avail.39  The widespread gang violence and the lack of protection from the 
government and law enforcement authorities in their countries left these women with no alternative 
than to migrate. 
Chapter III has utilized data on asylum applications and asylum demographics from both 
DHS reports and UNHCR studies to show that there have been major shifts in asylum trends in 
the Northern Triangle nations in the past ten years.  All three nations have shown an increase in 
both affirmative and defensive applications for asylum, a decrease in approval of both affirmative 
and defensive claims, and a surge in unaccompanied minor, women, and family units arriving at 
the U.S. Southern border.  Though the data from the DHS and UNHCR reports clearly shows the 
drastic shifts that asylum trends for Central Americans have undergone from 2011 until 2017, there 
has been no policy shift in asylum adjudication in response to these new demographics.  The rise 
in MS-13 and La 18 power, influence, and control in the Northern Triangle is directly correlated 
to the increase in migrants and asylum seekers from the region.  The extortion, recruitment 
techniques, physical and sexual assault that the gangs perpetuate in the region has created a new 
refugee crisis in Central America and U.S. asylum policy should reflect that.  Having established 
relevant legal definitions, a profile of the main gang actors, and a profile of recent migration and 
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asylum trends in the region, the following chapters will explore how victims of gang violence from 
the Northern Triangle have a legitimate “well-founded fear of persecution” and why victims of 
this persecution qualify for political asylum. 
Chapter IV. Well-Founded Fear 
Referencing the definition of asylum provided in Chapter I, one qualifies for asylum in the 
U.S. if they are able to establish a “well-founded fear of persecution” in their native country.  
Therefore, in order to analyze the veracity of an asylum claim, it is important to give explicit details 
about the threat that the asylee is fleeing; in the case of claims to asylum for victims of gang 
violence in the Northern Triangle that means that the “well-founded fear” of gang violence from 
gangs must be proven.  While Chapter II of this thesis offered historical context and general 
demographics for the development and spread of both MS-13 and La 18 in the Northern Triangle 
nations of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, this chapter will elaborate on the most common 
crimes and forms of violence that the victims profiled in Chapter III are fleeing in order to show 
that the threat of gang violence does indeed constitute a well-founded fear of persecution.   
Common Crimes 
The rise to power that the two main gangs in the Northern Triangle experienced in the 
twentieth century are “both a symptom and a cause of a deteriorating security environment,”40 as 
the gangs have been overpowering the weak post-war economies and governments in the region. 
Gang ranks have swelled due to widespread economic and social insecurity and they engage in a 
number of violent criminal activities.  According to an FBI assessment, MS-13 members in 
particular are engage in “drug distribution, murder, rape, prostitution, robbery, home invasions, 
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immigration offenses, kidnapping, carjackings/auto thefts, and vandalism.”41  Most of these 
criminal offenses referenced by the FBI are inherently violent and threatening in nature and are 
known to affect anyone in the gang’s vicinity, marero or not.  Serving as an economic and social 
rival to MS-13, La 18 engages in most of the same criminal activity and is shown to have a very 
similar hierarchical structure.  The rivalry itself seems to be the main difference between the gangs, 
as animosity towards MS-13 created “a reason to join, a reason to fight, a reason to celebrate when 
one of the other gang’s members was dead”42 for La 18.  Local factions of both gangs, also called 
clicas, are equally represented in the Northern Triangle nations and the violent enmity between 
them only adds to the violent crimes that they bring to the region.  Both gangs engage in the same 
kinds of regional control tactics, further fueling their conflict, and the two main activities that both 
MS-13 and La 18 employ to exploit their territories are la renta, a form of extortion, and physical 
assault. 
Extortion 
One of the main sources of income for both MS-13 and La 18 in all three Northern Triangle 
countries is the collection of la renta, a “security” tax and form of extortion.  Members of MS-13 
and La 18 will charge local business owners a tax for the gang’s “protection” of the business – 
protection from whom is unclear.  The amount of rent a business owner is charged depends on the 
kind of business the owner is involved in and the amount of revenue the business brings in, with 
the fee usually oscillating somewhere between 10 and 40 percent of total revenue.43  The amount 
                                                        
41 Federal Bureau of Investigations. "The MS-13 Threat: A National Assessment." January 14, 
2008.  
42 InSightCrime. MS13 in the Americas: How the World’s Most Notorious Gang Defies Logic, 
Resists Destruction. Publication. Center for Latin American & Latino Studies, American 
University. Washington D.C.: American University, 2018. 1-90. 24. 
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that the two gangs have made off of charging la renta alone has been estimated to be closed to $31 
million per year, with some clicas making up to $17,000 per month from extorting businesses.44  
In Honduras, an InSight Crime survey of extortion victims has shown that a single clica could 
make upwards of $2.5 million a year through extorting taxi and bus companies alone.45  The 
victims of extortion are exclusively private citizens, and the corruption of government and local 
police forces, discussed in greater detail later,  gives the citizens little alternative than to pay la 
renta.  Locals know that there is no real option other than to cooperate with regard to la renta, as 
“complaints to the police about gang extortion are reportedly often relayed back to the gangs, 
which then exact severe retribution on the complainants.”46  The extent that extortion remains un- 
or under-reported is vast, and it has been shown in a recent study that roughly 84% of businesses 
in El Salvador declined to report the extortion demands they faced for fear that the local authorities 
will relay the information back to the gangs.47  Faced with the choice between an economic loss 
or a physical assault, the extent of which varies depending on the gang and the amount of la renta, 
most business owners are forced to cooperate at the expense of their livelihood. 
Assault 
Members of MS-13 and La 18 are the main perpetrators of sexual and physical assaults 
throughout the Northern Triangle.  While the warring gangs engage in transnational inter-gang 
violence, civilians are nevertheless often victim to gang-related physical and sexual assaults.  
Civilian victims of physical assault are often targeted due to failed attempts at recruitment or 
                                                        
44 InSightCrime. MS13 in the Americas. 40. 
45 Ibid. 40.  
46 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.  “Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the 
International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from El Salvador.” 2016.  24. 
47 Cantor, David James. "‘As Deadly as Armed Conflict? Gang Violence and Forced Displacement 
in the Northern Triangle of Central America’." Agenda Internacional 23, no. 34 (2016). 77-97. 88. 
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collection of la renta, as “those who resist or thwart gangs’ efforts to gain financial, territorial, or 
political control suffer the consequences; gangs intimidate, coerce, torture, murder, and decapitate 
in service of these goals.”48  The price for resisting or rebuking either gang’s activities is one’s 
physical security, and the retribution is swift.  The frequency of demands for violent revenge 
exacted by gang leaders can be seen in a 2016 recording of an MS-13 meeting in El Salvador, 
where fourteen homicides of gang members, recruits, and civilians were authorized by gang 
leaders in the course of an hour; the same recording shows that five days later another 12 murders 
were authorized.49  Whether the victims of these homicides were involved in gang activities or not 
is unclear, but it is likely that civilians were among the victims because a study conducted by the 
Guatemalan Procuradoría de Derechos Humanos [Attorney General for Human Rights] showed 
that 27.4% of deaths of those 25 and under from July 2002 to August 2003 were the result of gang 
attacks on civilians.50  Murder is an extreme form of violence that civilians in gang-controlled 
areas are victim and witness to, however other physical and sexual assaults are similarly common.  
The victims of sexual assaults perpetrated by gang members are not limited by gender or 
involvement; men, women, civilians, and gang-members alike have fallen victim to assault by high 
ranking mareros: “Women are routinely abused and raped within the gang community… Gang 
members inside jail have been known to take advantage of their privilege with younger, 
incarcerated members, and gang members on the outside have been known to rape women without 
any consequences.”51  With gender and gang membership being of little consequence to who suffer 
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America: A Development Challenge. By Rodrigo Serrano-Berthet and Humberto Lopez. 2011. 
16. 
51 World Bank. Crime and Violence.” 26. 
A Credible Fear: The Politics of Gang Violence in the Northern Triangle 
A Case Study by Jane Dowd 
 
 26 
physical and sexual assaults committed by mareros there are few options to avoid becoming a 
victim. 
MS-13 and La 18 engage in various criminal activities and forms of violence in the region, 
targeting mareros and civilians alike.  The widespread violence that the citizens of the Northern 
Triangle nations face from the gangs has a direct link to the migratory trends of the region, and 
contributes to the growing number of Central American asylum seekers in the U.S.  Given the 
demand of la renta and the widespread homicides, physical, and sexual assaults in the region, the 
asylum qualification of a “well-founded fear of persecution” has been met by the victims of gang 
violence in the Northern Triangle.  The impunity that mareros are able to utilize in the Northern 
Triangle is a result of the state and security force’s failure to protect their citizenry and the 
following chapter will explore the ways in which the gang activities in the region constitute a 
“well-founded fear of persecution based on political opinion” by analyzing the gang infiltration of 
and widespread corruption within the region’s governments. 
Chapter V. The Politics of Gangs 
Violence in the Northern Triangle is rampant and perpetrated by two main armed groups, 
the gangs of MS-13 and La 18 and the state security forces.  Both the gangs and the security forces 
in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras foster a culture of violence by engaging in extremely 
violent confrontations with each other and civilians are often caught in the crossfire.  The forces 
that are meant to protect victims of gang violence in the region spread violence similar to the gangs 
and have been shown to be either inefficient or corrupted by gang bribery.  By being both unwilling 
and unable to protect their citizenry, the state has failed the victims of gang violence and has 
allowed the gangs to function as de facto political entities.  The four previous chapters of this thesis 
have set out to define historical and legal definitions of asylum, to profile both the perpetrators and 
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victims of gang violence in Central America, and to show that the criminal activity threatening 
asylum-seekers from Central America constitutes a “well-founded fear of persecution.”  This 
chapter will outline the ways in which gang violence constitutes political persecution in the 
Northern Triangle by showing how the government forces have failed to protect their citizens, how 
they have been corrupted by gang influence, and how the gangs have become legitimized political 
entities. 
Failed Policies 
The governments of the Northern Triangle nations have consistently failed in their efforts 
to combat gang violence in the region.  Their attempts at combating MS-13 and La 18’s territorial 
control is evidence in the failure of the region’s mano dura, or “iron fist,” policies.  The laws were 
first introduced in 2003 by then-President of El Salvador Francisco Flores Pérez and subsequently 
adopted by then-President of Guatemala Otto Pérez Molina and then-President of Honduras 
Ricardo Maduro. An extreme effort to eliminate the gang threat in Central America, the mano dura 
policies gave power to local police and federal security agents to arrest and interrogate individuals 
with impunity. In the first years of the program in the early 2000s El Salvador, security forces 
“carried out mass arrests without legal basis and made excessive and arbitrary use of detention, 
especially of youth suspected of being gang members.  The security forces have reportedly 
subjected suspected gang members in their custody to severe physical mistreatment.  Newspaper 
journalists reporting on these stories have reportedly received death threats.”52  Police and military 
forces in the region used mano dura as an excuse to propagate the same the widespread violence 
and fear-mongering tactics of the gangs in the name of security.  Not only was the policy 
controversial for its contribution to the culture of violence in the Northern Triangle, but it did not 
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have a marked effect on the criminal activities or influence of the gangs.  When the mano dura 
policy was ultimately declared unconstitutional by the Salvadoran Supreme Court, an undeterred 
President Flores introduced the policy of super mano dura, a fortified version of the original 
policy.  The policy was similarly unsuccessful, and super mano dura “is reported to have provided 
the impetus for gangs to become more organized and ruthless, whilst at the same time engendering 
among members of the security forces a lack of respect for the human rights of youth suspected of 
being gang members.”53  As evidenced by the failed violent and overreaching tactics of mano dura 
and super mano dura, the Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran state security forces have not 
only failed to protect their civilian populations but their failure has resulted in an increase in gang 
organization and recruitment. 
Despite the condemnation of mano dura policies by the United Nations, the heavy-handed 
approach remains popular with the current governments in the region.  In El Salvador, for example, 
current Salvadoran President Salvador Sánchez Cerén has been criticized for continuing mano 
dura policies and being ineffective at combatting gang violence.  The criticism comes after 
analysis of his anti-gang policies shows that homicide rates in 2018 reached levels comparable to 
the peak homicide rate in 2015.54  Recent anti-gang policies in Guatemala have also failed, and in 
2006 the United Nations and the Guatemalan government created the Comisión Internacional 
contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG) to create an international body in the nation to help 
prosecute organized crime and other complicated cases.  The agreement came to an end on January 
7th, 2019 when Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales’ expelled of CICIG despite objections from 
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his country’s Constitutional Court.55  In 2019 Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández has 
largely focused his anti-gang policies on continuing the ineffective mano dura policies by sending 
military and national police forces into the streets to arrest suspected gang members, and his 
presidency remains engulfed in controversy surrounding his avoidance to target drug-traffickers 
in Honduras and the violent suppression of protesters against his presidency.56  The Northern 
Triangle nation’s governments continued reliance on mano dura policies that have proven to be 
both repressive and ineffective and have allowed the ranks of MS-13 and La 18 to continue to 
grow.   
Regional Corruption 
It is not only policy failures that have contributed to government ineffectiveness in the 
Northern Triangle as the governments failures are further complicated by the region’s extensive 
political corruption.  The World Bank’s Governance Indicators from 2008 show that levels of 
public trust in the governments of three nations are some of the lowest in the world and have 
continued to decline.  Global measurements of the Indicator for Control of Corruption places 
Honduras in the bottom quintile and global measures of the Rule of Law places El Salvador in the 
bottom third of the world and Guatemala in the bottom 10%.57  Corruption in the region is 
spearheaded by gang influences and interests and has been reported in the police, military, and 
judicial branches of each Northern Triangle nation. 
Police Corruption 
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 The corruption of police forces in the Northern Triangle is a widespread and critical 
problem; victims of gang violence are unable to trust the forces designated to protect them.  As of 
2010, 48.8% of Salvadorans, 65.9% of Guatemalans, and 47.2% of Hondurans surveyed in an 
AmericasBarometer study believe that their local police are involved in criminal activities.58  This 
public distrust of police forces is due to frequent media reports of police officers’ involvements in 
homicides, physical assaults, and gang activities and has created an environment where gang 
victims are unable to report criminal activity to the police.  Recalling the description of la renta in 
Chapter IV, victims of extortion very rarely report the crime to the police for fear that the officer 
will report their complaint directly back to the gang that extorted them.  What is more, “frequent 
arrests of high-level police officers who have been involved in organized crime rings while 
themselves leading the all‐out war against gangs suggest, for example, that the scope of police 
reforms have been hindered by the very efforts expended in carrying out draconian wars against 
gang‐led crime.”59  The policy failures mentioned earlier have contributed to levels of police 
corruption in the Northern Triangle nations and have intensified public distrust of security forces.  
The corruption of police forces further oppresses victims of gang violence and is one of the signs 
of the significant role that MS-13 and La 18 play in the politics in the region. 
Military Corruption 
 Military forces in post-civil war Central America maintain a tense relationship with the 
public.  The civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala were marked by tumultuous military coups, 
widespread violence, and repression. Honduras was used as a military training ground for various 
C.I.A. backed counter-insurgent forces and the Battalion 3-16, a Honduran army unit that tortured 
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and murdered political insurgents.  In the twenty-first century, civilians still maintain a wary 
perception of the military and must frequently interact with the military since soldiers are often 
deployed to carry out police functions.  The public’s relationship to the military has not improved 
since this intense period in the twentieth century and the reported MS-13 and La 18 infiltration of 
military forces has done nothing to improve public trust.  The relationships between the militaries 
and the gangs in the Northern Triangle are reciprocal as gang infiltration of the military is offset 
by military presence in the gangs and for most “it is no coincidence that many criminal syndicates 
there are run by retired military officers with political connections.”60  Furthermore, in 2002 the 
Guatemalan military’s entire Anti-Narcotics Operation Department had to be disbanded after 320 
officials were found to be on the payroll of local criminal leaders, aiding rather than eliminating 
the influence of drug traffickers and gangs in the country.61  The mutually beneficial relationship 
between the major gangs in the Northern Triangle and the military forces tasked with combatting 
them shows that the gangs are powerful enough to wield great influence over governmental 
security forces, further jeopardizing the safety of victims of gang violence. 
Judicial Corruption 
 Corruption in the Northern Triangle is not limited to its security forces; should a crime 
reach a judiciary in the region its adjudication will still be subject to gang influence.  The low level 
of prosecutions and indictments of gang members for their involvement in extortion, drug 
trafficking, or assault have shown that MS-13 and La 18 have influence in the courts.  The Insight 
Crime analysis of MS-13 in the Northern Triangle references the case of marero Moris Alexander 
Bercián Manchón, a.k.a. “El Barney,” tried for drug trafficking in El Salvador in 2009: “Since his 
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capture, judges designated to hear the case have postponed hearings, suddenly become ill and even 
released Barney on his own recognizance only to have him flee when they reissued orders to 
capture him.”62  The case of “El Barney” in 2009 is one of many examples where gang influence 
results in judicial ineptitude in the Northern Triangle.  It has been reported that in cases involving 
the prosecution of gang members, “various organs of the justice system appear to be acting in 
criminal complicity by lending a veneer of legitimacy to acts of judicial corruption… This has 
implications for other public agencies and sometimes involves illicit ties to individual attorneys or 
law practices.”63  The expansion of corruption ties to attorneys and law practices shows that the 
entire criminal justice systems in place in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras are susceptible to 
corruption from MS-13 and La 18 influences.  The strength of the gangs has allowed them to 
manipulate police, military, and judicial forces in the region and has aided in creating an 
environment of lawlessness surrounding gang activity.  The victims of gang violence and gang 
crimes are left with little plausible recourse in pursuing justice for their suffering.  
The impact that MS-13 and La 18 exert on security forces and judicial systems in the 
Northern Triangle shows that their influence in the region is inherently political.  Having 
preferential influence within the very forces that are tasked with arresting and indicting the 
mareros, MS-13 and La 18 have established a firm standing within the political systems of El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. 
Political Aspirations 
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  The first step that shows how MS-13 and La 18 are becoming more political in their 
structures is the establishment and maintenance of influence within the security forces and judicial 
systems in the Northern Triangle.  The second step of their political transformation is made evident 
by  “…their willingness to form a coalition with rival factions, by new tactics aimed at influencing 
the political process, and by their stated objectives to do more than earn money.”64  Factions of 
both MS-13 and La 18 are cooperating with one another in order to overpower political opponents 
that hinder their goals of financial and territorial gains.  The structures and rivalries of the gangs 
are adapting in response to mano dura policies and their ability to infiltrate governmental forces 
and they are leveraging their power into political influence. 
Gang Truce 
 The first time that members of MS-13 and La 18 were brought to the same negotiating 
table was the 2012 San Salvador gang truce.  The truce was supported by the El Salvador 
government and the Catholic Church and lasted from 2012 until 2013, a year that saw a 50% 
decline in the nation’s homicide rate.65 The truce was mediated by government and church officials 
and was reached by negotiating less gang violence for more freedom for gang leaders in prisons.  
During the 2012 negotiations, “the Government recognized that all parties had a legitimate role in 
the dialog to ease the violence… the truce provided a framework for separate criminal 
organizations to create a single opposition political movement.”66  By involving gang-leaders in 
official negotiations the Salvadoran government recognized and therefore legitimized the role of 
gangs in the nation’s security and politics.  As part of the truce the Salvadoran government lessened 
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restrictions on gang-leaders in prison and decreased raids on gang-led neighborhoods, thus 
establishing a political route for MS-13 and La 18 to join together and bargain for more favorable 
treatment from the state.  When the truce ultimately dissolved in 2013, the gangs knew that they 
had influence within the government and used violent means to bring the government back into 
negotiations by proclaiming a transport strike and murdering city bus drivers who disobeyed.67  
Having negotiated with the government in an official capacity during the 2012 truce, the political 
roles of MS-13 and La 18 in El Salvador were essentially confirmed.  As fundamentally 
transnational organizations, the gangs have continued to solidify their political status throughout 
the Northern Triangle.  
Mara 503 
 The negotiations of the 2012 truce in El Salvador brought high-ranking members of MS-
13 and La 18 together on the same side of the table, in effect producing a coalition of gang interests 
in the region.  The power of their role in the negotiations has led some members from both gangs 
to deflect and create a supra-organization of both gangs’ political interests called Mara 503: "Mara 
503 spokespersons stated that they intended to seek greater political influence by participating in 
elections, controlling local elected officials, especially mayors, infiltrating police and military 
forces and taking over civilian associations.”68  While the influence of gangs in political structures 
in the Northern Triangle have since been based on more clandestine infiltration and corruption of 
political forces, Mara 503 presents itself as an intentionally political group that means to exert 
even greater influence and control over political and security forces in the region.  Mara 503 is 
mostly active in El Salvador, however the Salvadoran government has issued alerts to authorities 
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in Guatemala and Honduras regarding the likely spread of the gang over their borders.  The 2018 
account of a member of Mara 503 being apprehended by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol shows 
that the influence of this new organization is spreading transnationally.69  While the inter-gang 
cooperation and formation of Mara 503 are recent to the twenty-first century, gangs have pursued 
political influence in the Northern Triangle since their introduction into the region’s post-war 
government instability. 
Law & Order 
The inability and unwillingness of the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras to effectively combat MS-13 and La 18 within their borders is exacerbated by their 
institutional weaknesses.  The instability and inefficiency of the region’s governments has made it 
difficult for their citizens to access basic services and protections and in these instances’ clicas of 
MS-13 and La 18 have stepped in to fill the void.  The extent of the role that the gangs play in 
local services is dependent on the political and social capital that they have gained in the area.  In 
areas that a faction has a strong foot-hold on la renta and territorial control, gang members have 
been shown to “act as an effective arbiter in domestic or neighborly disputes; participate directly 
in community associations or non-governmental organizations; provide votes (or impede them) in 
elections as well as other services for local political actors; and open the door to economic 
opportunity.”70  The absence of any police or government influence in gang-controlled areas 
creates an opportunity for the mareros to act as de-facto political organizations and provide 
services for the people living in their territory.  In these areas the gangs are paid la renta, they 
engage in their criminal activities and export violence freely and are able to structure society to 
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their preferences.  The corruption and inefficiency of state police, military, and judicial forces have 
created a political vacuum that members of MS-13 and La 18 have been all-too-willing to fill.  
 Chapter V has shown the extent to which factions of MS-13 and La 18 have influenced 
politics in the Northern Triangle.  The combination of the failure of the Salvadoran, Guatemalan, 
and Honduran governments mano dura policies, the corruption of security and judicial forces in 
the region, and the politicization of MS-13, La 18, and Mara 503 show that the current role of 
gangs in the Northern Triangle is inherently political.  They have infiltrated standing government 
forces, begun to establish a semblance of a political party to export their ideals, and functioned as 
de facto governments in neglected territories.  Following the UNHCR interpretation of political 
opinion to include ‘any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of State, government, 
society, or policy may be engaged,’71 victims of gang violence from the Northern Triangle qualify 
for political asylum in the U.S. based on a well-founded fear of persecution based on anti-gang 
political opinion.  
Conclusion 
The topic of analysis of this thesis merits further research regarding precedential case law 
concerning asylum and previous claims of political persecution.  An analysis of adjudication of 
asylum claims for victims of terrorist organizations could be used in a comparison of the structure 
of terrorist organizations and international gangs.  Additionally, any advocation for the rights of 
gang victims in the U.S. would need to be judged against the current political environment and 
popular immigration-related rhetoric in the U.S.   
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The right to asylum has been internationally protected in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights for over 71 years.  The United States has been a signatory to the refugee protections 
codified in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees for 68 years.  Turning our back 
on asylum seekers at our Southern border is not only amoral, it goes against international 
regulations that our nation agreed to over half a century ago.  It would appear that our nation has 
always had a questionable asylum adjudication process, as a 1970 piece by famed refugee advocate 
Arthur Helton raises critiques that ring true today.  Helton argued 39-years-ago that “The right to 
asylum itself is under attack. We hear often of a "crisis" in asylum in America.  That crisis, 
however, lies not in the increasing numbers of asylum seekers, but rather in whether the right of 
asylum can withstand the expedient policy solutions which have until now governed the 
process.”72  The asylum process in the U.S. is not reflective of the conditions that asylum seekers 
flee, and the historical preference for communism defectors and European nations shows this.  Not 
only is the U.S. a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and therefore 
obligated to protect the world’s most vulnerable migrants, but when our nation’s policies and 
foreign interventions create political and criminal environments abroad that are unlivable for its 
people, we have a heightened responsibility to offer safety.  Helton’s piece explains how 
partisanship and foreign policy have sullied the asylum process in the U.S. and highlights the risks 
of flexible policies.  He states that “The notion that asylum may be denied as a matter of 
"discretion" is questionable under international and domestic law. Whether the "discretionary 
asylum" concept will be expanded to cover other situations remains to be seen. Any such expansion 
would risk swallowing whole the right to asylum.”73  Echoing Helton, this thesis argues that the 
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right to asylum is not discretionary.  An analysis of the circumstances of victims of gang violence 
in the Northern Triangle shows that there are legitimate claims to political asylum on the basis of 
a well-founded fear of persecution based on anti-gang political beliefs. 
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CBP  – Customs and Border Patrol, the federal enforcement agency of the 
Department of homeland Security 
 
CICIG  – Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala / The 
International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala 
 
Clicas   – The Spanish word for local factions of gangs 
 
DHS    – Department of Homeland Security 
 
EOIR  – Executive Office for Immigration Review, the judicial branch of the 
Department of Homeland Security 
 
FMLN  – Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, one of major political 
parties in El Salvador 
 
IIRIRA  – The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 
 
INA    – The Immigration and Nationality Act 
 
La 18    – Barrio 18, the second most powerful gang in the Northern Triangle 
 
Mano dura   – “the iron fist,” a set of harsh anti-gang policies in the Northern Triangle 
 
Mareros   – the Spanish word for gang members 
 
MS-13   – Mara Salvatrucha, the most powerful gang in the Northern Triangle 
 
Northern Triangle  – refers to the nations of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras 
 
Policia nacional civil  – the Spanish translation of National Civil Police 
 
La renta  – an extorton tax collected by the gangs 
 
UDHR   – the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
UNHCR   – The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
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